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Abstract
We study corporate income tax competition when firms operating in multiple
jurisdictions can shift income using financial planning strategies. Several
such strategies, particularly intra-corporate lending, appear to be actively
pursued by companies to reduce subnational corporate taxes in Canada. A
simple theoretical model shows how interjurisdictional tax planning can give
rise to asymmetries in jurisdictions’ tax policies, with one jurisdiction
becoming a “tax haven” to attract taxable income through financial
transactions, while others set higher statutory rates. Further, increased
competition from tax havens may paradoxically lead to tax increases by high-
tax jurisdictions. Analysis of data from administrative tax records suggests
income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases in Canada.
According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with
respect to tax rates for “tax shifting” firms is 4.3, compared to 1.6 for other,
comparable firms.
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1   Introduction
Recently, two Canadian provinces – Alberta and Ontario – have announced sharp reductions to take
place in general corporate income tax rates, from 15.5 per cent to 8 per cent by the year 2005.
However, such dramatic changes have occurred in the past – Quebec lowered its corporate income
tax rate on active business income from 16 per cent to 5 per cent in 1982, but has slowly raised the
rate to about 9 per cent over the past two decades. At the same time, most other provinces have
either held their corporate income tax rates to remain the same or slightly increased since 1986
when corporate income tax reform was introduced at the federal level with a strategy of rate
reduction and fewer tax incentives.
Similarly, at the international level, there has been a significant decline in statutory corporate
income tax rates, falling from about 48 per cent in 1980 to 34 per cent in 2000 (Mintz and Chen,
2000). At the same time,  governments have been  broadening  tax  bases and removing incentivesfor capital investment. Corporate income tax revenues as a percentage of GDP has been rising and
even marginal effective tax rates on capital have risen in many countries over time.1.
What explains the competitive behaviour of governments with respect to the statutory corporate
income tax rate? As a number of papers have pointed out, reported income of corporations can be
highly elastic with respect to the statutory tax rate since income can be easily shifted from one tax
jurisdiction to another without moving real assets.2 Several empirical studies have found evidence
of highly elastic responses in tax bases that are consistent with income shifting (for example, see
Hines (1999), Grubert and Slemrod (1998), and Harris et al. (1993)). Hines (1994) suggest that
income shifting can be quite dramatic: a tax haven’s tax rate increase of 1 per cent would lower
reported earnings by 7 per cent. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2000) report that a 1 percentage point
change in a country’s tax rate leads to a decline in reported before-tax income of 2.7 per cent.
Jog and Tang (2001) suggest that a corporate income tax rate reduction of one percentage point
can increase taxable income of Canadian corporations by about 20 per cent. A number of recent
theoretical contributions have studied corporate tax competition in the presence of multinational
ﬁrms and proﬁt shifting strategies. Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) developed a model of inter-
national proﬁt shifting through manipulation of transfer prices that is related to our model of debt
shifting introduced below; however, they do not consider the implications of proﬁt shifting for the
location of real investment. Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000) introduce investment into a model of
transfer pricing, but their focus is on the implications of proﬁt shifting for investment tax credit
provisions in corporate tax systems.
Few studies have examined income shifting at the subnational level,3 in part because many
countries only have a corporate income tax at the national level and some that have subnational
corporate income tax structures, like the United States, require consolidation of companies within
a corporate group and an allocation of proﬁts according to a formula based on factors such as
sales, payroll and capital. Allocation methods make it more difﬁcult for a company to use certain
techniques, particularly ﬁnancing, to shift income from high to low tax jurisdictions.4 Therefore,
the sensitivity of taxable income to subnational rate changes would be expected to be lower for
companies that allocate income, compared to those that do not. On other hand, when consolidation
is not permitted, as in Canada, subnational tax rates would be expected to impact signiﬁcantly
more on taxable income of those companies that establish separate subsidiaries in each subnational
jurisdiction, since income shifting via ﬁnancing techniques is easier to implement.
Section 2 of the paper describes a theoretical model that motivates the optimal choice of cor-
porate income tax rates in the presence of income shifting via ﬁnancing techniques. We show how
income shifting inﬂuences real investment decisions of corporations and incentives in tax-setting
of competing governments. The remainder of the paper provides evidence on the extent of in-
come shifting by corporations among Canadian provinces. Section 3 provides background on the
Canadian corporate income tax system. Section 4 estimates elasticities of taxable income for the
1See Devereux and Grifﬁth (1998) and also the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1998)
2For a recent survey on corporate tax competition, see Mintz (2000).
3See Hines (1996) for an examination of foreign direct investment at the subnational level. See also B¨ uttner (1999)
for an examination of German municipal corporate income tax rates.
4Many studies tend to focus on transfer pricing techniques for shifting income at the international level. However,
the simplest way to shift income is through ﬁnancial transactions, including “double dipping” deductions for interest
expenses (see Mintz, 2000). At the subnational level, “double dipping” is not easily accomplished, given the absence
of low-tax havens, but ﬁnancing is a cost-effective method to shift income in the absence of allocation methods for
determining subnational income. However, as Søren Bo Neilsen pointed out to us, corporations can generally shift only
normal proﬁts on capital with ﬁnancing techniques, while transfer pricing (including misreporting of interest rates) may
be used to shift rents as well.
2provinces and examines how tax rate elasticities differ for ﬁrms that can engage in interjurisdic-
tional tax planning and those that cannot. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 A model
Consider a single ﬁrm with the opportunity to invest in n jurisdictions. If Ki is invested in productive
capital in jurisdiction i, cash ﬂow net of non-capital costs accruing to the ﬁrm there is Fi(Ki), where
Fi is a strictly concave, increasing function. The ﬁrm incorporates separately and borrows Di in
each jurisdiction, and ﬁnances the balance of investment costs Ki   Di with equity. The pre-tax
costs of debt and equity ﬁnance are r and r, respectively, equal in all jurisdictions since investors
may lend in a single, integrated capital market, and there are no differential personal taxes levied
on investment income received from the various source jurisdictions.5
Each jurisdiction operates a separate source-based, classical corporation income tax system,
levying a tax rate ti on corporate earnings net of interest expenses, Fi(Ki) rDi. After-tax corporate
earnings in jurisdiction i are then
pi(Ki,Di) = (1   ti)(Fi(Ki)   rDi)   r(Ki   Di)
To elucidate the impact of income shifting on the ﬁrm’s investment decisions, we suppose that
the ﬁrm may freely borrow and lend among subsidiaries incorporated in each jurisdiction, and
interest expenses in each jurisdiction may be deducted up to the full amount Ki invested there.6
We further suppose that, on a consolidated basis, the ﬁrm’s external debt is constrained not to
exceed an exogenous fraction a of its capital stock, so that ￿i Di  a ￿ Ki. Thus, while lending
among subsidiaries is unlimited, borrowing from external sources is not. In the absence of some
restriction on leverage, the ﬁrm could avoid all taxes on marginal investments by issuing debt, so















The solution to the problem is most easily characterized by considering the nested problem,
in which the ﬁrm ﬁrst chooses a ﬁnancial strategy D for any investment plan K, and then makes
its investment decisions given the optimal ﬁnancial strategy D(K). Let m denote the Lagrange
multiplier for the aggregate leverage constraint. The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for D
i is then
r   (1   ti)r + m  0
with equality if Di < Ki. Since ￿ Di = a ￿ Ki and Ki  0, at least one constraint must be slack, say
Dm < Km. The ﬁrst-order conditions for D then reduce to
ti > minft1,...,tng =) D
i = Ki (2)
5Thus in particular we abstract from jurisdiction-speciﬁc withholding taxes on capital income. This simpliﬁcation is
appropriate for the case of provincial corporate income taxation in Canada, which we study in our empirical work below.
In order to deal with international proﬁt shifting, the model could easily be amended to deal with these issues.
6Since the borrowing constraint for each subsidiary is Di  Ki, we ignore the possibility that local tax authorities
impose thin capitalization rules.
3together with the leverage constraint ￿ D
i = a ￿ Ki. Since borrowing among subsidiaries is a
pure arbitrage activity in the model, an optimal strategy for the ﬁrm is to borrow the maximum
deductible amount in any jurisdiction with a statutory tax rate above the minimum of all jurisdic-
tions, say tm = minft1,...,tng, and to issue a mix of debt and equity in low-tax jurisdictions to
satisfy the aggregate leverage constraint.
Now consider the determination of real investment. An expression for the ﬁrm’s after-tax proﬁt
given its optimal ﬁnancial strategy can be obtained by substituting the ﬁrst-order conditions (2)




i (K)) = ￿
i
f(1   ti)Fi(Ki)   [cm   r(ti   tm)]Kig (3)
where
cm = (1   a)r + a(1   tm)r
is the weighted-average after-tax cost of capital in jurisdiction m.7 In effect, the ﬁrm’s strategy
is to ﬁnance all investment by issuing a mix of debt and equity in jurisdiction m and lending to
subsidiaries in high-tax jurisdictions to ﬁnance investment there. The unit cost of investment in
i is then the after-tax ﬁnancial cost cm, less the tax gain through debt shifting of r(ti   tm). The





cm   r(ti   tm)
1   ti
(4)
A full characterization of the effects of taxation on investment in the model requires that we de-
termine the relationship between the costs of debt and equity ﬁnance in the model. We adopt the
(standard but admittedly extreme) assumption that investors are indifferent between debt and eq-
uity income on the basis of non-tax characteristics, and that the two forms of income are taxed at
the same rate through the personal income tax system. It follows that r = r in equilibrium, so that










Thus, in the presence of income shifting, the effective tax rate on investment in jurisdiction i,
say ti = tm/(1   ti), depends both on the local tax rate (where rents to production are taxed) and
the tax rate of the low-tax jurisdiction (where capital income is effectively taxed).8 Let K
i (ti) =
F0 1
i (1 + ti) denote the ﬁrm’s optimal investment in jurisdiction i. Equation (5) shows how real
investment distortions depart from standard effective tax rate calculations in the presence of income
shifting, and how statutory tax rates of high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions interact to affect the
location of real investment. Proposition 1 summarizes these implications.
7For simplicity, we describe the solution for the case in which a unique jurisdiction levies the lowest tax rate tm. The
analysis is unchanged, however, if several jurisdictions levy tm.
8This reﬂects the fact that shifting one dollar of capital income from a high-tax jurisdiction gives rise to an additional
tax liability tm in the low-tax jurisdiction, and is a consequence of our assumption that securities prices adjust in equilib-
rium to make investors indifferent to holding debt and equity. As Søren Bo Nielsen pointed out to us, other assumptions
about arbitrage opportunities of ﬁrms and investors leave to different equilibrium returns to debt and equity, and differ-
ent conclusions about investment distortions. For instance, another possible equilibrium has (1   tm)r = r (ﬁrms are
indifferent to issuing debt and equity in the low-tax jurisdiction). In this case, the additional tax on shifted income in the
low-tax jurisdiction is offset by an additional tax deduction in the high-tax jurisdiction, so that the user cost expression
reduces to F0
i = r/(1 tm), which is independent of the tax rate in the source jurisdiction. However, such an equilibrium
exists only if there are constraints on individual holdings of debt and equity and unlimited arbitrage trading by ﬁrms.
4Proposition 1 The marginal effective tax rate on capital in any jurisdiction is an increasing function
of the lowest tax rate levied in all jurisdictions. In particular, if the lowest tax rate is zero, then the
marginal effective tax rate in all jurisdictions is zero, independent of the local tax rate.
Proposition 1 points to a very direct spillover in governments’ tax policies when multi-jurisdiction
ﬁrms may shift taxable income through ﬁnancial transactions: the statutory rate affects the user-
cost of capital in high-tax jurisdictions and so distorts investment there. This inﬂuences strategic
interactions among governments, the subject of the next section. As well, the proposition shows
that income shifting may reduce investment distortions in high-tax jurisdictions, even as it leads to
erosion of corporate tax revenues there.
2.1 Equilibrium tax rates
How does the presence of income shifting by multi-jurisdiction ﬁrms inﬂuence tax policy design and
the game among competing governments? To provide a heuristic analysis, we restrict attention to
the case of two jurisdictions (n = 2), and we simplify the preceding model of ﬁnancial strategy by
assuming the ﬁrm is constrained to issue only equity on its consolidated balance sheet, so that a =
0. Since the cost of ﬁnancial capital r is ﬁxed in equilibrium, we set it to unity in order to suppress
it from the notation. In this case, the ﬁrm’s strategy is particularly simple: for any investment levels
(K1,K2), it raises K1 + K2 by issuing equity in the low-tax jurisdiction, say jurisdiction 2, and it
lends K1 to its subsidiary in the high-tax jurisdiction in order to ﬁnance real investment there.
Suppose that governments move simultaneously in choosing tax rates ti 2 [0,1] and seek to
maximize corporate income tax revenues.9 Consider the problem from the perspective of a single
jurisdiction, say jurisdiction 1. If t1 > t2, then the ﬁrm shifts all capital income to jurisdiction 2,
and revenues of the high-tax jurisdiction are
RH
1 (t1,t2) = t1[F1(K1)   K1] (6)
where K1 = K
1(t1) and the effective tax rate is t1 = t2/(1  t1). If t1 < t2, in contrast, then capital
income is shifted to jurisdiction 1, and revenues are
RL
1(t1,t2) = t1[F1(K1) + K2] (7)
where Ki = K







1(t1,t2) if t1 < t2
2 [RH
1 (t1,t2),RL
1(t1,t2)] if t1 = t2
RH
1 (t1,t2) if t1 > t2
(8)
Our analysis is formally similar to the model of Janeba and Peters (1999), who consider a
game between two jurisdictions that choose a single tax rate that applies to two tax bases, one of
which is mobile internationally and one of which is not. So, in our model, the statutory corporate
9The assumption that governments maximize revenues rather than welfare is less restrictive here than in standard
models of capital tax competition, since governments do in fact value rents to production through their effect on tax
revenues. It is straightforward to show that augmenting the objective of the high-tax jurisdiction (where the tax base is
equal to production rents) to include a fraction of rents merely subtracts a constant from its best-response tax rate. The
case of the low-tax jurisdiction (where the tax base is rents plus capital income) is more complicated, but the extension
does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence qualitative results.
5income tax rate of each jurisdiction is effectively levied on two distinct bases of different degrees
of mobility: rents to local investment by the ﬁrm Fi   Ki, and worldwide capital income K1 + K2
that may be costlessly shifted between the two jurisdictions.10 As in Janeba and Peters, the perfect
mobility of the latter tax base induces a discontinuity into governments’ revenue functions along
the ray t1 = t2. It follows that a Nash equilibrium in which the two governments set equal tax rates
cannot exist in the model, even if F1() = F2(), so that the two revenue functions are symmetric.
To see this, observe that a symmetric equilibrium could only exist at t1 = t2 = 0, since if the
two governments set equal positive tax rates then at least one could gain through a small tax rate
reduction that attracted all tax planning income.11 When both tax rates are zero, however, either
government would beneﬁt from a deviation to a strictly positive tax rate: while all capital income
would shift to the low-tax jurisdiction, the deviating government would derive positive revenues
from taxes on locational rents Fi   Ki in the jurisdiction.
It follows that, in any Nash equilibrium, governments set different tax rates. To simplify mat-
ters, we characterize an equilibrium (t
1,t
2) in which t
1 > t
2. (The case in which t
1 < t
2 is
analogous.) In this case, all capital income is shifted to jurisdiction 2. Necessary conditions for
such an equilibrium is that each tax rate is a local best response to that chosen by the other juris-
diction; i.e. there exists no unilateral deviation that increases revenue of either jurisdiction, given














Further, existence of an equilibrium requires that neither jurisdiction can beneﬁt from a deviation




















Conditions (9)–(12) are jointly necessary and sufﬁcient for existence of a Nash equilibrium.
What characteristics of a jurisdiction are conducive to it adopting a high or low tax rate in
equilibrium? Intuitively, a low tax rate that attracts income shifting into the jurisdiction imposes
costs on each government in the form of lost revenues from immobile production rents Fi   Ki.
Since governments compete in a Bertrand-like fashion for mobile capital income, the incentive to
become a low-tax jurisdiction is stronger in the jurisdiction with lower production rents per unit of
capital invested.
10If governments could choose investment tax credit rates in addition to statutory tax rates, it would be possible to levy
distinct tax rates on real investment and on “tax planning” income. See Slemrod (2001) and Hauﬂer and Schjelderup
(2000) for a discussion.
11This argument relies on K1 + K2 > 0 and Fi   Ki > 0 for all (t1,t2).
62.2 Intensiﬁcation of tax competition
The foregoing analysis suggests that, in the presence of income shifting, jurisdictions’ tax rates may
diverge despite tax competition, as high-tax jurisdictions tax locational rents to the ﬁrm, and real
investment escapes high tax rates through income shifting. How do high-tax jurisdictions respond
to intensiﬁcation of competition from tax havens?
In standard models of competition for productive capital (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986),
tax rates of competing revenue-maximizing governments are, under weak conditions, strategic
complements, and a tax reduction by a single jurisdiction leads to tax reductions by all its com-
petitors. When competition is for ﬁnancial rather than real capital, however, intensiﬁcation of tax
competition may lead to further divergence in rates. To see this, observe that the best response of














where we have used the ﬁrst-order condition (5) for the ﬁrm’s investment decision. Thus the
ﬁrst-order impact of a decrease in t2 is to decrease the marginal deadweight loss of taxation in
the high-tax jurisdiction (since ¶K1/¶t1  0), which tends to increase the tax rate of the high-tax
jurisdiction. This incentive is strongest when t2 = 0, so that increases in t1 do not distort the
ﬁrm’s investment decision, and the best response of jurisdiction 1 is to choose the maximal tax rate
t1 = 1. More generally, the slope of the reaction function of the high-tax jurisdiction depends on
the curvature of the ﬁrm’s capital demand function K
1(t1), and tax rates of the two jurisdictions are
unlikely to be global strategic substitutes in general. When K
1 is a linear function of the tax rate












In the linear case, the reaction function of the high-tax jurisdiction slopes downward at all tax rates.




























Thus tax rates of two jurisdictions are strategic substitutes in the linear case.
Proposition 2 In the linear case, an exogenous tax reduction by the low-tax jurisdiction induces an
increase in the equilibrium tax rate of the high-tax jurisdiction, and conversely.
Thus, when competition among jurisdictions is for highly mobile ﬁnancial capital rather than
real investment, intensiﬁcation of tax competition need not lead to convergence in tax rates. In
particular, a tax cut by a low-tax jurisdiction reduces investment distortions elsewhere, and govern-
ments may respond by increasing tax rates.
73 Subnational corporate taxation in Canada
Canada provides a useful case study of income shifting through ﬁnancial transactions and its im-
plications for how provinces may engage in corporate income tax rate competition. Canada does
not consolidate income earned by corporate groups for tax purposes, so that multi-jurisdictional
companies with separate subsidiaries in each province have opportunities to shift income from
high-tax (such as British Columbia) to low-tax jurisdictions (such as Quebec). On the other hand,
there are many multi-jurisdictional companies with branches and sales ofﬁces in different provinces
which must allocate income across provinces according to an allocation formula agreed upon by the
provinces.12 Thus, there are three types of companies relevant to our study: (i) ﬁrms that operate
in a single jurisdiction, (ii) ﬁrms that operate in multiple jurisdictions through separate subsidiaries
and so do not allocate income, and (iii) ﬁrms that operate in multiple jurisdictions through a single
corporate entity, so that income of the corporation is allocated across provinces according to the
formula.
In Canada, provinces may set their own corporate income tax rates. Three provinces (Alberta,
Ontario and Quebec) collect their own corporate income taxes; these together account for about 75
per cent of provincial corporate income (Technical Committee on Business Taxation, 1998, Chapter
10). The rest of the provinces allow the federal government to collect the corporate income tax
on their behalf, while retaining the right to set their own statutory corporate income tax rates.
Generally, the provinces have a general rate of tax on large corporations that vary from as low as
9.12 per cent in Quebec to as high as 17 per cent in New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan (as of 1999). Quebec imposes a higher tax rate on investment income of corpora-
tions. Most provinces (except Quebec in recent years) provide a lower corporate income tax for
small Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPCs).13 A few provinces have lower tax rates on
manufacturing and processing income, as does the federal government. Table 1 reports combined
federal and provincial statutory rates for large corporations and small CCPCs for 1986, 1999, and
for an average of the 1986-99 period. As the Table indicates, statutory rates on large corporations
have declined over the past ﬁfteen years, mostly as a result of reductions in federal rates; rates
levied on small businesses have remained stable. Moreover, statutory rates for large corporations
declaring income in Quebec are substantially lower than in other provinces, although the difference
in rates has recently declined somewhat in recent years. Canada integrates corporate and personal
taxes by providing a dividend tax credit and excluding a portion of capital gains from taxation. At
the small business level, the combined corporate and personal tax rate on equity income is roughly
equal to the personal rate on employment and interest income, while for large companies com-
bined tax rates on equity income exceed that of other income. When the small corporate tax rate
has been changed in the past, governments have typically adjusted dividend and capital gains tax
rates to maintain integration at the small-business level, in order to minimize incentives for shifting
between corporate and personal tax bases.
Provinces that have concluded tax collection agreements with the federal government adhere
to the same tax base as for the federal corporate income tax (except for provincial tax credits).
While the three provinces that collect their own corporate income taxes may set any tax base, they
generally have followed the federal rules for determining taxable income. Corporate income tax
12This is unlike the United States, where individual states have been free to choose the weights for allocating income.
Although there are some small differences among jurisdictions in Canada, the weights are generally the same. See Report
of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1998), Chapter 10.
13The low tax rate applies to the ﬁrst $200,000 (a lower threshold applied in the mid-1980s). Since 1992, the low
rate is clawed back for companies with more than $10 million in taxable capital (essentially book assets). All income is
taxed at the full rate when taxable capital exceeds $15 million.
8Table 1: Combined federal-provincial tax rates, by size and province
General tax rates Small business tax rates
Province 1986 1999 Average 1986 1999 Average
Atlantic provinces 0.52 0.44 0.45 0.23 0.18 0.21
Quebec 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.14 0.21 0.17
Ontario 0.52 0.43 0.45 0.24 0.22 0.23
Prairie provinces 0.53 0.45 0.46 0.24 0.21 0.22
Alberta 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.19 0.19 0.19
British Columbia 0.53 0.45 0.45 0.22 0.20 0.22
All provinces 0.49 0.42 0.43 0.21 0.20 0.21
Notes: Tax rates are averages of rates levied on manufacturing-
processing and other industries, weighted by 1984 provincial industry
value-added shares.
harmonization has led provinces to agree in general to a common method of allocate income across
the provinces. The general formula for allocating income is the sum of shares of payroll and sales in
a province, divided by two. Some other formulas are used for special cases such as transportation
and ﬁnancial industries—these replace the sales factor with other indicators, such as passenger
miles and assets.
There are several important rules that impact on the willingness of provinces to engage in
corporate income tax competition:
 The federal government provides equalization payments to all provinces except Ontario, Al-
berta and British Columbia. The effect of the formula, especially for the small provinces, is
that a rate reduction that leads to a greater corporate income tax base can reduce the amount
of equalization paid to the province. Therefore, the equalization program can reduce the
incentive for smaller equalization-recipient provinces to engage in tax competition (Smart,
1998).
 Provincial corporate income taxes are not deductible from federal corporate income tax, so
that there is less incentive for provinces to raise corporate income tax rates if the burden of
tax increases were shared with the federal government.
 Given the lack of corporate consolidation, there can be signiﬁcant incentives for companies
that do not allocate corporate income, to shift proﬁts from high-tax to low-tax provinces.
The well-known Quebec ﬁnancing lease structure results in companies shifting income from
high-tax provinces to Quebec where there is a substantially lower rate of tax. There are some
tax rules to limit the ability of companies to shift income across jurisdictions, even within a
corporate group of subsidiaries separately located across provinces. For example, companies
cannot deduct interest expense if debt is more than the ﬁxed and other real assets of the
corporation.
4 Income shifting and tax base elasticities
A central assumption of our model is that corporate taxable income is substantially more mobile
among jurisdictions when ﬁrms may use income shifting strategies, so that tax setting by govern-
9ments is governed principally by competition for ﬁnancial ﬂows rather than for productive invest-
ment. To lend support for this assumption, we examined administrative tax data for Canadian
provinces and estimated elasticities of taxable income for corporations that have signiﬁcant inter-
jurisdictional tax planning opportunities and for those that do not.
4.1 Data and estimation procedure
The principal source of our data is the Corpac data set, which is maintained by the Canadian
Customs and Revenue Agency and which records a subset of information from T2 tax records for
the universe of Canadian corporations. We use Corpac’s recorded taxable corporate income and
total declared assets14 as dependent variables in our analysis.
Corpac includes records for an average of nearly 900,000 ﬁrms in each year in the 1986-99
period. In order to preserve conﬁdentiality, the Department of Finance aggregated the data; that
is, ﬁrm-level records were summed for each province and year in which the corporations oper-
ated and the broad industry groups that were their principal lines of business. Data for the small
provinces were combined, yielding seven province identiﬁers in our constructed data set: Atlantic
provinces, Quebec, Ontario, Prairie provinces, Alberta, and British Columbia.15 Similarly, there
are seven industry groups in our data set: Primary, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation,
Communications and Utilities, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Services. Financial corporations
were excluded from the population.
The source data set also contains information on whether the corporation allocated income
to several provinces for tax purposes or paid tax in only a single province, and on whether the
corporation is a subsidiary of another corporation. (It is not possible, however, to link records
of members of a corporate group.) Since these characteristics inﬂuence the ability of the ﬁrm to
engage in income shifting, the data were aggregated by the Department of Finance into distinct
groups of ﬁrms that paid tax in a single or in multiple jurisdictions, and groups of ﬁrms that are
subsidiaries and those that are not. The data were also aggregated separately for ”small” ﬁrms that
paid tax in a single or in multiple jurisdictions.16 In summary, the aggregation procedure yielded
six categories of ﬁrms (four large ﬁrm categories and two small ﬁrm categories) for each of the 588
province-industry-year cells, and a total of 3509 observations. (Nineteen cells were not available
to us, because of conﬁdentiality restrictions.)
Using the constructed data, we estimated taxable income elasticities for the standard log-linear
speciﬁcation:
logyiptc = x0
iptcb + hc log(1   tiptc) + eiptc (17)
where yiptc is real taxable income per capita of ﬁrms in province p, industry i, year t, and ﬁrm
category c; tiptc is the corresponding combined federal and provincial statutory tax rate, and xiptc
is a vector of other explanatory variables.
Our speciﬁcation allows tax rate elasticities hc to differ based on observable characteristics
of ﬁrms that are related to their ability to shift income among jurisdictions using tax planning
strategies. In our preferred speciﬁcation, we estimate separate elasticities for three categories of
ﬁrms: (i) large corporations that pay tax in a single province (i.e. that do not allocate income using
14Total of all current capital, long term assets and assets held in trust, as reported on ﬁrm’s balance sheet.
15The Atlantic provinces are Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The Prairie
provinces are Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Together, these six small provinces comprised less than 15 per cent of the
Canadian population during the 1990s and eight per cent of corporate proﬁts.
16“Small” ﬁrms are corporations eligible for the federal small business deduction, i.e. Canadian-controlled private
corporations with income less than $200,000 and assets less than $15 million.
10the statutory formula) and are subsidiaries of other corporations; (ii) other large corporations; and
(iii) small corporations. (We experiment with other classiﬁcations below.) To the extent that this
classiﬁcation is a good proxy ﬁrms’ opportunities to engage in interjurisdictional tax planning, we
expect the estimated elasticity for the ﬁrst category of ﬁrms to reﬂect income shifting as well as
mobility of real investment, whereas elasticities for the latter two categories should mainly reﬂect
mobility of real investment. (Since our data set does not record information on ﬁrms’ deductible
interest expenses or leverage decisions, it is not possible to identify debt-shifting activities per se.)
For convenience, we refer to the three categories as “shifters”, “non-shifters”, and “small” ﬁrms.
Naturally, drawing policy inferences from our approach is a precarious exercise, and our esti-
mates cannot be regarded as estimates of structural parameters. Importantly, however, it is likely
for a number of reasons that our approach underestimates true differences in elasticities of shift-
ing and non-shifting ﬁrms. First, our classiﬁcation places ﬁrms that are subsidiaries but which do
some business in multiple provinces in the second, non-shifting category, and subsidiaries that are
related only to ﬁrms incorporated in the same province (for which income shifting opportunities
are therefore limited) in the ﬁrst, shifting category. Both of these misclassiﬁcations should lead
to attenuation bias in elasticity estimates. Second, our approach regards corporate organization
decisions as exogenous, unrelated to tax rate differences among provinces. In reality, an increase
in tax rate differentials is likely to induce more ﬁrms to incorporate separately in a number of ju-
risdictions in order to engage more easily in income shifting. For this reason as well, therefore, our
approach tends to underestimate “structural” tax rate elasticities.
4.2 Estimates
Table 2 reports estimates of equation (17) for the classiﬁcation of ﬁrms described above. In column
(1), explanatory variables include, in addition to the statutory tax rate, the logarithms of real
provincial per capita income (“income”) and an index of US producer prices for the industry in
which the ﬁrms operate (“export price”),17 together with ﬁxed effects for ﬁrm type and the complete
set of province-industry interactions. Thus we employ a “difference-in-differences” estimator, in
which identiﬁcation of tax rate elasticities is derived from differences in tax rates among industries,
provinces, and ﬁrm types. Results in this column are consistent with expectations. The estimated
tax rate elasticity for “shifting” ﬁrms is 4.3; put differently, a one percentage point reduction in the
tax rate from 0.43 (the mean for large ﬁrms in the sample) to 0.42 induces a 7.5 per cent increase
in taxable income. As expected, estimated elasticities for the two categories of “non-shifting ﬁrms
are much smaller: 1.6 for other large corporations and an insigniﬁcant 0.1 for small ﬁrms. It
is perhaps not surprising that income of small ﬁrms is insensitive to tax rates, since for non-tax
reasons most of these ﬁrms are likely to be immobile across provincial boundaries. More important
is the ﬁnding that elasticities are substantially lower for large non-shifting corporations, which are
otherwise comparable to the shifting ﬁrms.
The remaining three columns of the Table present results for different speciﬁcations of the
other explanatory variables. The speciﬁcation in column (2) includes year ﬁxed effects, which
control for unobserved factors affecting all ﬁrms that may be correlated with tax rates. (In the
base speciﬁcation, the primary control for economic factors is the export price variable.) Estimated
elasticities in this case are comparable, although point estimates are somewhat higher. Column (3)
reports results for a speciﬁcation that excludes the province-industry interaction ﬁxed effects but
includes ﬁxed effects for industry and for province-ﬁrm type interactions. This speciﬁcation allows
us to investigate the possibility that our results merely reﬂect differences in corporate organization
17The US price data are from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
11Table 2: Estimated taxable income elasticities
Dependent variable: log real
taxable income per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log (1   t) for ﬁrm type:
1. large single-jurisdiction 4.3 4.9 3.6 4.4
subsidiaries (0.9) (0.9) (1.1) (0.8)
2. other large corporations 1.6 2.3 1.1 1.8
(0.6) (0.7) (0.6) (0.6)
3. small ﬁrms 0.1 1.2 -6.0 0.4
(1.8) (1.9) (2.6) (1.8)
log income 3.8 3.0 3.9 –
(1.0) (1.4) (1.0)
log export price 1.7 0.9 1.4 1.7
(0.4) (0.8) (0.4) (0.4)
R2 0.32 0.33 0.29 0.33
Fixed effects:
Industry-province interactions yes yes no yes
Year effects no yes no no
Province-ﬁrm type interactions no no yes no
Notes: All regressions include province, ﬁrm type, and industry
ﬁxed effects.
: Signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
among provinces—for example, that ﬁrms in low-tax provinces are less likely to operate in multiple
jurisdictions or more likely to be members of corporate groups for reasons that are unrelated to
tax rates. Estimated elasticities for large corporations are smaller in this case (3.6 for shifting ﬁrms
and 1.1 for non-shifting ﬁrms), but the difference between elasticities of shifting and non-shifting
ﬁrms remains signiﬁcant. The estimated elasticity for small corporations is signiﬁcantly negative
in this case, which leads us to reject the speciﬁcation in any case. Column (4) reports results for a
speciﬁcation identical to that of column (1), except that provincial per capita income is excluded
as a potentially endogenous regressor. Estimated elasticities are essentially the same.
Table 3 reports estimates for alternative classiﬁcations of ﬁrms into the shifting and non-shifting
categories. To aid in comparisons, column (1) of the Table repeats the estimates for our base spec-
iﬁcation, i.e. from column (1) of Table 2. In all columns, other regressors are income, export price,
and industry-province and ﬁrm type ﬁxed effects. In column (2), “shifters” are deﬁned as all large
corporations that are subsidiaries of other corporations. Thus ﬁrms that are subsidiaries but that
allocate income among several provinces by formula are reclassiﬁed from the second category to
the ﬁrst. The predicted impact of this on estimated elasticities is ambiguous, since the reclassiﬁed
ﬁrms may include both shifting ﬁrms with high elasticities and non-shifting ﬁrms with low elastic-
ities. In fact, the estimated tax rate elasticity for shifting ﬁrms is 2.7 in this case, compared to 4.3
in the base speciﬁcation. The estimate for non-shifting ﬁrms remains unchanged at 1.6, but the dif-
ference between the two elasticities becomes insigniﬁcant in column (2) (p-value of 0.15). Column
12Table 3: Alternative classiﬁcations of ﬁrm type
Dependent variable: log real
taxable income per capita
(1) (2) (3)
log (1   t) for ﬁrm type:
1. large “shifters” 4.3 2.7 4.9
(0.9) (0.7) (0.7)
2. large “non-shifters” 1.6 1.6 3.2
(0.6) (0.7) (0.7)
3. small ﬁrms 0.1 0.0 1.3
(1.8) (1.8) (1.8)
log income 3.8 3.8 3.4
(1.0) (1.0) (1.1)
log export price 1.7 1.7 1.7
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
R2 0.32 0.33 0.55
Notes: All regressions include ﬁxed effects for industry–province inter-
actions and ﬁrm type. The classiﬁcations of ﬁrm type are:
(1) “shifters” are subsidiaries that do not allocate.
(2) “shifters” are all subsidiaries.
(3) “shifters” are all subsidiaries, and ﬁrms that allocate are ex-
cluded from the regression.
: Signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
(3) reports results for a third classiﬁcation of ﬁrms; in this case, ﬁrms that allocate taxable income
are excluded entirely from the sample, so that “non-shifters” consist only of large corporations that
are not subsidiaries and that pay tax in a single jurisdiction. The estimated elasticity of non-shifters
is larger in this case at 3.2, which is somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, the difference between
estimates for shifting and non-shifting ﬁrms remains signiﬁcant (p-value of 0.03).
Table 4 reports results for analogous regressions using different dependent variables, including
taxable income per ﬁrm, taxable assets per capita, and taxable assets per ﬁrm. Since it is not
possible to assign the assets of multi-jurisdictional ﬁrms to the various provinces in which they
operate, multi-jurisdictional ﬁrms were deleted from the sample, and the classiﬁcation of ﬁrms
corresponds to that in the last column of Table 3. To aid in comparisons, column (1) of Table 4
repeats the results for that speciﬁcation with real taxable income per capita as the dependent
variable. In column (2), the dependent variable is real taxable income per ﬁrm. This is unlikely to
be the correct dependent variable for the analysis, since if production occurs under constant returns
to scale, as in standard theories of tax competition, the model offers no prediction for the effects
of taxes on the number of ﬁrms operating in a jurisdiction. Nevertheless, results in this case may
be more comparable with other studies based on ﬁrm-level data. In this case, tax rate elasticities
for all ﬁrm categories are signiﬁcant and positive, but our main result is reversed: the elasticity for
large “non-shifting” ﬁrms at 6.1 exceeds that of tax shifting ﬁrms at 3.1. Column (3) reports results
of a regression in which the dependent variable is real taxable assets per capita. Observe that,
like taxable income, reported assets should respond to tax rate differentials when ﬁrms engage in
13Table 4: Alternative dependent variables
Real TI Real TI Real assets Real assets
per capita per ﬁrm per capita per ﬁrm
log (1   t) for ﬁrm type:
1. large “shifters” 4.9 3.1 4.0 1.6
(0.7) (0.7) (0.6) (0.5)
2. large “non-shifters” 3.2 6.1 1.1 2.6
(0.7) (0.5) (0.6) (0.4)
3. small ﬁrms 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.1
(1.8) (0.5) (1.5) (0.3)
log income 3.4 4.2 2.4 1.6
(1.1) (0.3) (0.9) (0.2)
log export price 1.7 0.3 0.4 -0.1
(0.4) (0.1) (0.3) (0.1)
R2 0.55 0.77 0.44 0.92
Notes: In all cases, the regression speciﬁcation is the same as column (3) of
Table 3.
: Signiﬁcant at 5 per cent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
tax shifting. Such “asset shufﬂes” may reﬂect avoidance of corporation income taxes on operating
through leasing strategies (see Section 3 above), avoidance of capital gains taxes, and avoidance
of provincial capital taxes. Once again, the estimated tax rate elasticity is largest at 4.0 for shifting
ﬁrms, and is in this case insigniﬁcantly different from zero for other corporations. Column (4)
repeats the regression using taxable assets per ﬁrm as the dependent variable. As with column
(2), the estimated elasticity for large non-shifting ﬁrms exceeds that of shifting ﬁrms, although the
difference in this case is insigniﬁcant (p-value is 0.11). Again the speciﬁcation based on assets per
capita seems preferable, since the theory offers no predictions about the impact of taxes on the
number of ﬁrms in a jurisdiction.
5 Conclusion
In recent years, the process of globalization has brought nations closer together and, apparently,
brought their governments into greater competition for business tax bases. Two aspects of glob-
alization have had important and conceptually distinct implications for business tax competition:
reductions in transportation and communication costs may make real business investment more
mobile across jurisdictional boundaries, and ﬁnancial innovation and liberalization may facilitate
international tax avoidance by less footloose ﬁrms.
Our analysis suggests that the distinction between these two forms of economic integration
is important. When ﬁrms may costlessly shift income to low-tax jurisdictions through ﬁnancial
transactions, real investment choices of ﬁrms and the tax policy environment of governments are
changed. Income shifting tends to make the location of real investment less responsive to tax rate
differentials, even as taxable income becomes more elastic. Income shifting can induce stark asym-
metries in tax policies of competing governments, as some jurisdictions reduce statutory tax rates
14to attract taxable income, and other governments maintain high tax rates on inframarginal loca-
tional rents earned by ﬁrms, while tolerating erosion of the corporate capital income tax base that
results from income shifting. Since income to marginal investments can escape taxation through
income shifting, the effective tax rate on capital depends in part on statutory tax rates levied in
low-tax jurisdictions. Consequently, an intensiﬁcation of tax competition can paradoxically lead to
a divergence in tax rates of high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions.
Subnational corporate income taxation in Canada provides a useful case study of the effects
of income shifting. All provinces operate signiﬁcant corporate income tax systems but (consistent
with our model) one province, Quebec, imposes statutory tax rates substantially below those of
other provinces. Further, since corporate groups are not required to consolidate income for tax
purposes, a number of tax planning devices are essentially unrestricted for ﬁrms that incorporate
separately in different provinces. Consistent with the model, we ﬁnd that taxable income of corpo-
rate subsidiaries that do not allocate income is signiﬁcantly more elastic with respect to tax rates
than income of other, comparable ﬁrms that do allocate income by formula and those that are not
corporate subsidiaries. These results are suggestive of the role of income shifting in the investment
decisions of large, multi-jurisdiction ﬁrms, and of its implications for tax policy choices of affected
governments.
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